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Abstract
In Leclerc v. ‘Au ble vert’, the Court of Justice of the European Communities was asked to
decide whether national measures imposing resale price maintenance for book could violate Member States’ duties under Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
in conjunction with Articles 3(f), 85 and 86 thereof. The importance of the issues at stake justify
yet another attempt to define the implications of the system of undistorted competition for the exercise by Member States of retained powers. I will make this attempt by setting the issues raised
against the wider background of the constitutional rank of the objective of Article 3(f). I will also
try to distinguish more clearly between State measures directed to particular price levels and State
measures setting the essential parameters of the system of competition.

THE SYSTEM OF UNDISTORTED
COMPETITION OF ARTICLE 3(f)
OF THE EEC TREATY AND THE
DUTY OF MEMBER STATES
TO RESPECT THE CENTRAL
PARAMETERS THEREOF
Bastiaan van der Esch*
INTRODUCTION
In Leclerc v. 'Au bli vert',' the Court of Justice of the European Communities was asked to decide whether national measures imposing resale price maintenance for books could violate
Member States' duties under Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 2 in conjunction with
Articles 3(f), 85, and 86 thereof. A particularity of the French
system at issue was that the retail prices rendered obligatory
for book sellers were those fixed unilaterally by publishers,
without involvement of either the retailers or of the French authorities. Paragraph two of Article 5 ("Article 5(2)") obliges
Member States to "abstain from any measure which could
jeopardise the attainment of the objectives" of the Treaty.4
Article 3(f) defines as one of these objectives that a system of
undistorted competition is maintained.5 In substance, the
Court replied that in the present state of Community law a
* LL.D. Leiden. Former Senior Legal Counsellor for Competition to the Commission of the European Communities; Special Counsel, de Brauw en Westbroek,
advocaten en notarissen, 's-Gravenhage. The opinions expressed are in the author's
private capacity as a scholar.
1. Leclerc v. 'Au bl vert', Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH)
14,111.
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
3. See Leclerc, 1985 E.C.R. at 18, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,425.
4. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5(2), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 4, 298
U.N.T.S. at 17. See generally Temple Lang, Article 5 of the EEC Treaty: The Emergence of
ConstitutionalPrinciples in the Case Law of the Court ofJustice, 10 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 503
(1987).
5. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(f), 1973, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 3, 298
U.N.T.S. at 16, providing, as a purpose of the Treaty, for "the institution of a system
ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted." Id.
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measure of the type at issue was not prohibited by Article 5(2),
in conjunction with Articles 3(f) and 85.6 It is clear from the
reasoning, however, that had the Commission previously condemned resale price maintenance for books instituted by private agreements-in France or elsewhere-State measures of
similar content would have violated Article 5(2).'
The implication of this ruling is that the retained power to
institute resale price maintenance by law must respect not only
the Treaty rules on the free movement of goods but also the
system of undistorted competition of Article 3(f) in conjunction with Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. In a Community in
which economic nationalism is still rampant-often in blatant
violation of Treaty obligations 8 -this is not a popular idea with
national politicians. As to the legal profession, some authors
have commented on the judgment favorably' while others have
been critical. 10
The importance of the issues at stake justify yet another
attempt to define the implications of the system of undistorted
competition for the exercise by Member States of retained
powers. I will make this attempt from a slightly different angle.
Instead of relying mainly-as Judge Pescatore does-on the
need for symmetry between the Community's control over
14,111, at
20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
6. Leclerc, 1985 E.C.R. at 33,
15,436.
18-20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111,
7. Leclerc, 1985 E.C.R. at 32-33,
at 15,435-36. Private agreements stipulating resale price maintenance for books are
in force in most Member States. See id. at 25-26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,111, at 15,431.
8. See generally COMM'N,

SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETrrION POLICY (PUBLISHED

Eu1986') (1987).
9. See Galmot & Biancarelli, Les Reglementations Nationales en Mati're de Prix au Regard du Droit Communautaire, 1985 REV. TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUR. 269; Kuyper,
Comment, 1985 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 787; Marenco, Le Traite CEE Interdit-ilaux Etats
Membres de Restreindre la Concurrence?, 1986 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUR. 285; Waelbroeck,
Applications des Regles de Concurrencedu Traite de Rome a lAutorite Publique, 1987 REV. DU
MARCH COMMUN 25.
10. Slot, The Application of Articles 3(f), 5 and 85 to 94 EEC, 12 EUR. L. REV. 179
(1987). Transatlantic echoes of this debate are found in Pescatore, Public and Private
Aspects of European Competition Law, 10 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 373 (1987) [hereinafter Pescatore, Public and PrivateAspects]; Marenco, Competition Between National Economies and
Competition Between Businesses-A Response to Judge Pescatore, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 420
(1987); and Pescatore, European Community Competition Law-A Rejoinder by Judge Pescatore, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 444 (1987).
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE 'TWENTIETH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE
ROPEAN COMMUNITIES
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public and private interference with competition," I will set
the issues raised against the wider background of the constitutional rank of the objective of Article 3(f).
I will also try to distinguish more clearly between State
measures directed to particular price levels and State measures
setting the essential parameters of the system of competition.
In that approach, I will concentrate on the following points:
the retained powers of Member States and their interface with Treaty obligations;
contents and rank of the system of undistorted competition of Article 3(f);
Article 3(f) in conjunction with Article 5(2) and certain
methods used by Member States in the exercise of retained
powers;
Article 3(f) in conjunction with Article 5(2) and resale
price maintenance; and
symmetry or asymmetry in free movement of goods
and competition.
In order not to maintain suspense at an intolerable level, I
indicate from the outset that I agree with the thrust of the
Leclercjudgment here at issue. Both its reasoning and its result
have solid roots in the case law that deals with the demarcation
between Treaty obligations and the exercise of retained powers. No major shift in this demarcation line is either intended
or implied. I also share Judge Pescatore's concern for a more
symmetrical interpretation of the Treaty and for greater coherence in the way in which the fundamental objectives of free
movement of goods and of undistorted competition are made
a reality. 12

Mr. Marenco's fears'" are in my view unjustified. His criticisms of the Leclerc judgment and of the Pescatore article are
on the whole unconvincing. My main objection is that his arguments move outside the mainstream of Community law as
defined by the Court.
11. Pescatore, Public and Private Aspects, supra note 10, at 373.
12. Pescatore, Public and Private Aspects, supra note 10, at 416-17.
13. Marenco, supra note 10, at 442-43.
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I. RETAINED POWERS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND
THEIR INTERFACE WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS
The EEC Treaty necessarily has reduced the panoply of
instruments of government at the disposal of Member States in
the pursuit of their national policies. Although Member States
retain the main responsibility for such areas of government as
economic (monetary and fiscal), social, industrial, and environmental policies, the powers at their disposal are affected in various degrees by their membership in the Community. Some
traditional powers have been wholly abandoned, such as the
power to impose customs duties or quantitative restrictions on
imports from other parts of the Community. 4
Other powers have been retained, but their exercise is
subject to express Treaty provisions. State subsidies, for example, apart from certain rules of procedure, must respect a
number of substantive criteria.15 Analogous substantive restrictions apply to state commercial monopolies, public enterprises, and indirect taxation. 16 The use of these national policy
instruments must not run counter to the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.' 7
Still other powers have been retained without the formulation of specific rules of procedure or of substance to constrain
their exercise. This is the case with trading rules promulgated
for such purposes as fair competition (minimum quality requirements), consumer protection (safety standards), or standardization. The exercise of these powers is limited by the general obligations of Articles 30 to 36 not to create any protectionist effect, unless strictly defined exceptions apply.' 8 In
addition these powers are subject to harmonization and to a
14. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 12-13, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 7, 298
U.N.T.S. at 19-20.
15. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 92-94, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 35-36,
298 U.N.T.S. at 51-52.
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 37, 90, and 95, respectively, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 1, at 15-16, 34, 36-37, 298 U.N.T.S. at 29-30, 50, 53.
17. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
18. See Gormley, Customs Union and Free Movement of Goods, in 52 HALSBURY'S
LAWS OF ENGLAND 21 (Part 12),
12.56, 12.58, at 102 (Lord Hailsham & D.
Vaughan 4th ed. 1986), and cases cited therein. Volumes 51 and 52 of Halsburys
Laws of England are a reprint of LAw OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (D. Vaughan ed.

1986).

19881

UNDISTORTED COMPETITION

413

Community obligation to end unjustified distortions. 19
To this last category belong national powers to fix prices,
either generally or for certain products. With the exception of
coal, steel, and agricultural products 2 0 no specific rules have
been formulated for their exercise; only the general rule of Article 30 applies. This is particularly the case with the establishment of minimum and maximum prices. It is established case
law that the level at which such prices are fixed must not interfere with the free movement of goods.2 1 In other words, where
imported goods have a cost advantage, the normal fruits of
that advantage in the shape of a greater market share may not
be taken away by the exercise of the power to fix prices.
Another example of retained powers that are not subject
to specially designed Treaty provisions exists in the domain of
competition. The competition rules of the Community coexist
with national antitrust provisions of varying severity. At a relatively early stage in the life of the Community, the interface
between Community competition law and national competition laws was clarified. Within the domain of application of the
Community rules, that is to say whenever single market conditions are affected by restrictive or abusive practices, parallel
application of national law may not interfere with the full and
uniform application of Community law.22
From what precedes, a distinct pattern emerges. It is a
ground rule of the Treaty that the exercise by Member States
of retained powers must respect the unity of the market, unless
otherwise stated.23 The same applies to the full uniform application of the competition rules.2 4 Where this obligation is violated, the measure in question is to that extent incompatible
19. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 100-102, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 37-38,
298 U.N.T.S. at 54-55.
20. See generally Vaughan, Paines, Rainey, & Turner, Competition, in 52 HALS19.22, 19.24, at 872-74 (Lord Hailsham &
BURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 857 (Part 19),
D. Vaughan 4th ed. 1986) [hereinafter Vaughan, Competition].
21. Roussel Laboratoria v. Netherlands, Case 181/82, 1983 E.C.R. 3849, 3870,
4 22-25, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4 14,044, at 14,721. See generally Gormley, supra
note 18, 12.79, at 114-15.
22. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 1969 E.C.R. 1, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8056.
23. Gilli and Andres, Case 788/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2071, 2078, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8683, at 8080; Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Branntwein (Cassis
de Dijon), Case 120/78, 1979 E.C.R. 649, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8543.
24. See Leclerc v. 'Au bli vert', Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1, 31, 4 14, Common
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with the Treaty; it may not be applied by any organ of the State
concerned and may expose the offending State to potential
tort liability.2 5
How does the power to institute resale price maintenance
by law fit into this pattern? It is at this point in the reasoning
that the particular nature of a measure of this kind must be
underlined. It is only superficially similar to the fixing of minimum or maximum prices. Such actions by Member States
trace lower or upper limits to interbrand and intrabrand competition alike, without interfering with the number of competitors operating within these limits. Provided the price is set at a
level compatible with the free movement of goods, the competitive system of the Community is not affected in its es26
sence.
Resale price maintenance imposed by law deprives the retailer of his normal power to determine his prices in the light
of his own commercial interests. The retailer is excluded from
normal intrabrand price competition, an important parameter
of any competitive system. The State does not limit price formation, but rather the effective number of competitors. In so
doing, intrabrand competition is withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Commission. Such measures naturally must respect
the free movement of goods. In addition, the question arises
of compatibility with the system of Article 3. To solve this
problem correctly, the content of that system and its rank in
the legal order of the Community must now be examined.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,435; Wilhelm, 1969 E.C.R. 1, 2, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8056, at 8757; Vaughan, Competition, supra note 20, 19.224, at 988-89.
25. See, e.g., Vaughan, Competition, supra note 20, 19.29, at 876-77, 19.101, at
921.
26. For a recent confirmation of that position, see Judgment of July 2, 1987,
Minist6re Public v. R6gis Lef~vre, Case 188/86, 1987 E.C.R. -.
The case concerned the retail selling price of beef. A certain manner of calculating retail margins
was ruled contrary to Article 30 and Council Regulation No. 805/68, OJ. L 148/24
(1968), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968 II, at 187, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
651 (as
amended), on the common organization of the market in beef and veal. Articles 5
and 85 were not considered relevant.
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II. CONTENT AND RANK OF THE SYSTEM OF
UNDISTORTED COMPETITION OF ARTICLE 3(f)
A. As To Content
Article 3(f) makes the institution of a system ensuring that
competition is not distorted one of the fundamental objectives
of the Community. That system is defined, first of all, in Articles 85-94 of the Treaty.2 7 It would be wrong, however, to see
in these provisions the sole source from which indications
about the content and scope of the system of undistorted competition may be drawn. The commitment of the Treaty to undistorted competition reaches well beyond these specific rules,
as various other provisions demonstrate. The main examples
are the following:
during the transitional period the Commission had the
task of applying the Treaty rules on the establishment of a
common customs tariff in a manner that, inter alia, would not
distort competition but rather ensure a rational development
28
of Community production;
during the same period in the agricultural domain, the
Community was obliged to fix criteria for minimum prices that
would respect natural advantages and encourage the necessary
29
adaptation and specialization within the Common Market;
- the absence of any unilateral power to close off a national market as a measure of retribution against other Member States that violate their Treaty obligations. The Treaty
contains three limited examples of such measures, but always
30
under Community control;
the obligation of the Member States to end distortions
of competition resulting from their actions, in accordance with
the procedures and criteria contained in Article 101; 1'
in the domain of common commercial policy, the obli27. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 85-94, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32-36,
298 U.N.T.S. at 47-52.
28. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 29, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 12-13, 298
U.N.T.S. at 26.
29. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 44(2) and (3), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 19,
298 U.N.T.S. at 33-34.
30. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 37(3), 46, 107, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at
15, 21, 40, 298 U.N.T.S. at 29, 35, 57.
31. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 101, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 38, 298
U.N.T.S. at 54.
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gation to take account of the increase in the competitive
strength of Community firms, which is likely to result from a
single market.3 2
These converging criteria emphasize that the transformation of hitherto national markets into a single economic space
relies on a system of undistorted competition in the sense of a
confrontation of all market participants, of all supply and demand, under single market conditions. In principle, this confrontation must be based on the unaided efforts and intrinsic
industrial and/or commercial merits of all operators. It is important to note that the addressees of these criteria include
Community institutions and Member States alike.
B. As To Rank
The Treaty itself does not distinguish explicitly between
higher and lower norms or between primary and secondary
objectives. Such distinctions are, however, inherent in any
highly developed legal system, especially of a federal or quasifederal nature. It is therefore quite natural that the notion of
the so-called fundamental rules or objectives was developed by
the Court.3 Certain Community aims are considered so fundamental to its existence and development that measures in
conflict therewith are normally ultra vires. The free movement
of goods within the Common Market provides the first example of this development. The Community institutions them32. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 110, 111(4), 111(5), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
1, at 41-42, 298 U.N.T.S. at 58-59.
33. See Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, Case 6/72, 1973
E.C.R. 215, 246, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171, at 8299-8300; Commission v.
French Republic, Case 167/73, 1974 E.C.R. 359, 369-71,
17-33, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8270, at 9189; Watson and Belmann, Case 118/75, 1976 E.C.R. 1185,
1198, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8368, at 7680; Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), Case 120/78, 1979 E.C.R. 649, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8543. For instances in which the doctrine has been applied see MusikVertrieb Membran v. GEMAJoined Cases 55 and 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. 147, 162, 14,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8670, at 7923; National Panasonic v. Commission, Case
136/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, 2057, Common Mkt, Rep. (CCH) 8682, at 8067; Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 552, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8527, at 8067. See generally Lasok, The Communities in 51 HALSBURY'S
LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 (Part 1),
1.09, at 18-20 (Lord Hailsham and D. Vaughan 4th
ed. 1986) [hereinafter Lasok, The Communities]; Pescatore, Aspects judiciaires des
l'acquis communitaire, 1981 REV. TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUR. 617, 620; von Zuleeg,

Grundsidtze, in KOmMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, (H. von der Groeben, H. von Boeckh,
I. Thiesing & C.-D. Ehlermann eds. 1983).
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selves cannot derogate from that principle.34 It is in that sense
that constitutional rank can be attributed to the fundamental
objective of Article 3(a) of the Treaty.35
In respect of the system of undistorted competition of Article 3(f), the case law of the Court contains similar indications.
The Community itself cannot dispense wholly with competition in the pursuit of other objectives. 6 This stands to reason.
It must be recalled in this context that Article 85(3)(b) stipulates that the Commission's power to exempt restrictive agreements from the interdiction of Article 85(1) ceases where such
agreements offer the "possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.

'3 7

It

follows from Article 87(1) and Article 89 that the Community's
normative powers to implement Article 85 and 86 must respect
the same limitation. 8 Coherence within the Community legal
order requires that this limitation also apply to the exercise of
other powers by the Commission, unless otherwise provided.
This points clearly to a preeminent position of Article 3(f) with
the same standing as Article 3(a), that is to say with the same
constitutional rank.
Confirmation of this status is found in the Used Oil judg34. Commissionnaires R~unis v. Receveur des Douanes, Joined Cases 80 and
81/77, 1978 E.C.R. 927, 944, 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8485, at 8708; see
also Charmasson v. Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance, Case 48/74, 1974
E.C.R. 1383, 1394,
17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8291, at 7356; Commission v.
United Kingdom, Case 231/78, 1979 E.C.R. 1447, 1459, 11, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH)
8546, at 7824. The latter two cases dealt with quantitative restrictions
within the common agricultural policy and illustrate also the prime importance attached by the Court to the free movement of goods.
35. On the treaties as the constitution of the Community, see Bernhardt, The
Sources of Community Law: The Constitution of the Community, in E.C. COMMISSION,
THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAw 69, 71 (1981). The Court itself refers to the trea-

ties as the constitutional charter on which the Community is founded. See Parti
Ecologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament, Case 294/83, 1986 E.C.R. Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,317.
36. Maizena v. Council, Case 139/79, 1980 E.C.R. 3393, 3422, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8704, at 8430; Fruit Company v. Commission, Joined Cases 41-44/70,
1971 E.C.R. 411, 428, 74, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8142, at 7631.
37. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85(3)(b), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32-33,
298 U.N.T.S. at 48; see also Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875,
1906, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7867.
38. The Council and Commission are directed by the Treaty to take action so as
to ensure the application of the principles of arts. 85-86. EEC Treaty, supra note 2,
arts. 87(1), 89, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 33, 34, 298 U.N.T.S. at 49-50.
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ment.3 9 In that judgment the Court ruled that the principle of
free competition, together with the free movement of goods
and the freedom to trade, was part of the general principles of
Community law. The language varies, as compared to other
judgments, but not the underlying idea, and strengthens the
conclusion that the system of undistorted competition of Article 3(f) constitutes a criterion of constitutional rank and importance.
III. ARTICLE 3(f) IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 5,
PARAGRAPH 2, AND CERTAIN METHODS USED
BY MEMBER STA TES IN THE EXERCISE
OF RETAINED POWERS
The Court has relied frequently on Article 5 as a legal basis for specific obligations of Member States beyond their express Treaty duties, either to act or to refrain from action.4'
These obligations arise whenever complete and proper
achievement of specific Treaty objectives or compliance with
express Treaty duties so requires. The exercise by Member
States of their retained powers of economic policy constitutes
an important sphere of application of Article 5(2). By virtue of
that provision, Member States are obliged to choose such modalities for their actions as will not endanger the integrity and
coherence of, inter alia, the system of undistorted competition
of Article 3(f).
Unfortunately, certain government actions fail to avoid
this danger. Frequently, Member States fix minimum or maximum prices on the basis of proposals previously agreed upon
by all or most of the operators, usually meeting in professional
or trade organizations. For air tariffs, resale price maintenance
is imposed by law at a price level derived from a previous
agreement among the airlines. 4 ' Methods of this type may take
39. Procureur de la Republique v. ADBHU, Case 240/83, 1985 E.C.R. 538,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,164.
40. See, e.g., Pluimveeslachterijen Midden-Nederland and van Miert, Joined
Cases 47 and 48/83, 1984 E.C.R. 1721, 1738, 23, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,087, at 15,171; INNO v. ATAB, Case 13/77, 1977 E.C.R. 2115, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8442; cf. Leclerc v. 'Au blWvert', Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1,31, 14,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,435. See generally Lasok, The Communities,
supra note 33, 1.39.
41. See generally Comment, Competition and Deregulation: Nouvelles Fronti~res for
the EEC Air Transport Industry?, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 808 (1987).

19881

UNDISTORTED COMPETITION

419

various forms. The agreement reached may be "authorized,"
"approved," or "confirmed," and at times the contents may be
made binding on non-participants. In still other cases the national authority may simply use the result of the agreementmostly the price level agreed-and make it the content of its
own legislative, regulatory, or administrative measure. Usually
the interdiction of Article 85(1) and the Commission's powers
under Article 85(3) are completely ignored.
Faced with that type of situation, Community law developed a two-pronged response, designed to protect the exclusive power of the Commission under Article 85(3) to decide
whether to exempt restrictive practices. For its part, the Commission attacked such agreements as incompatible with Article
85(1).42 This approach was later shared by the Court in a reply
to a preliminary question concerning another violation of the
same type.43 Furthermore, the Court, in reply to another preliminary question, held that Member States violated Article
5(2) whenever they required or favored the adoption of agreements contrary to Article 85 or reinforced the effects thereof.44
In other words, both the agreements in question and the State
action empowering them fall within the prohibitions of the
Treaty and are unenforceable.
The remedy to this state of affairs is twofold. Either industry abstains from presenting agreed prices to the public authorities and limits itself to the transmission of individual preferences and possibilities, or the agreement is notified and negative clearance or exemption is requested from the
Commission.
42. See Pabst & Richarz KG v. BNIA, OJ. L 231/24, at 27 (1976), Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 9863, at 9901-5; AROW v. BNIC, OJ. L 379/1, at 14 (1982), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,458, at 11,020.
43. BNIC v. Clair, Case 123/83, 1985 E.C.R. 391, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,160.
44. Ministere Public v. Asjes (Nouvelle Frontieres), Joined Cases 209-213/84,
14,237, confirmed in the Court's
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
1986 E.C.R. -,
judgment of October 1, 1987, Vzw Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. Vzw
Sociale Dienst van den Plaatselijke en Geviestelijke Overheidsdiensten, Case 311/85,
1987 E.C.R. -.

Following the ruling in Nouvelles Fronlieres, the Commission adopted

reasoned decisions under art. 89(2) of the Treaty enjoining a number of airlines to
bring their actions within the terms of the Treaty. Comm'n Press Release, IP (87)115
(Mar. 18, 1987), announced in Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,867; Comm'n Press
Release, IP (87)151 (Apr. 9, 1987), announced in Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,871.
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IV. ARTICLE 30f) IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 5,
PARAGRAPH 2, AND THE IMPOSITION OF
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE BY LA W
Measures of this type are in force in a number of Member
States, mostly in respect of pharmaceutical products, tobacco
products, and books. 45 In the service sector, the over-thecounter or retail price of air tickets and/or certain insurance
and bank rates 46 are similarly bound. Taken together, these
sectors form a sizable part of the Community's economy. In
most instances the price level of a product or a service that is
rendered obligatory for the retailer is decided unilaterally by
the manufacturer, the publisher, or the provider of the service.
If concertation occurs about retail price levels, the constraints
of procedure and of substance of Article 85 must be respected.
If there is no concertation, there remains the question of compatibility with Article 3(f) in conjunction with Article 5(2) of
resale price maintenance imposed by law as such.
In the GB-INNO-BM case 47 this question was addressed
for the first time, but only under Article 86 of the Treaty and
not with reference to Article 85, so the Court did not examine
the issue from that perspective.4 8 The questions put to the
Court in the van de Haar/Kaveka case 4 9 did raise the Article 85
aspect of the matter, but in terms that were too narrow and
that gave the Court the opportunity to limit itself to stating the
obvious, namely that Article 85 did not apply to State measures. Only in the Leclerc case did the national court focus its
question more on the compatibility of the French law on book
prices with the system of undistorted competition of Article
3(f) in conjunction with Article 5. 50 As the prices for books are
45. See BNIC v. Aubert,Judgment of Dec. 3, 1987, Case 136/86, 1987 E.C.R. -,
where the Court refers to such actions.
46. In the domain of banking a case is pending before the Court: P. van Eyke v.
ASPA NV, Case 267/86 (referral from the Vredegerecht for the Canton of Beveren
with respect to legislation on interest that may be paid on savings deposits challenged as incompatible with arts. 59-66 and 95 of the EEC Treaty).
47. INNO v. ATAB, Case 13/77, 1977 E.C.R. 2115, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8442.
48. Id. at 2151, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8442, al 7968.
49. van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern, Joined Cases 177 and 178/82, 1984
E.C.R. 1797, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,094.
50. Leclerc, 1985 E.C.R. at 29-30,
8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,111 at
15,434.
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fixed unilaterally by the publishers, without concertation with
the booksellers, the restriction of intrabrand competition was
achieved by State action only. French law did not require or
favor anticompetitive behavior by market participants; it made
such behavior superfluous.'
The fundamental significance of the Leclerc judgment resides in the fact that the Court did not use the absence of concertation as a pretext to deny the existence of a problem of
compatibility with Article 3(f) in conjunction with Article 5,
but on the contrary recognized that resale price maintenance
imposed by law did have to be looked at in the light of the
system of undistorted competition.52 One may have doubts
about the terms in which this recognition was couched and
about the consequences the Court drew from it, but the fact of
the recognition is undeniable. As to the reasoning leading up
to the Court's question in paragraph 15 of the judgment 3 the
arguments are not set in the broader framework here developed, but clearly have their roots in the idea that the system of
undistorted competition reaches beyond the implementing
provisions of Articles 85 and 86. The submissions of Advocate
General Darmon point in the same direction.54
This result can and should be approved. Resale price
maintenance imposed by law excludes a whole category of operators from the market mechanism. Retailers are deprived of
the opportunity normally provided by price competition to
contribute to the allocative efficiencies of the Common Market
as a whole. The Court has always been attached to price competition on the retail level 55 and it would be inconsistent to
make an exception for intrabrand competition just because its
suppression happens to be a national policy objective and is
achieved by the exercise of a retained power.
Possible objections are rather of a policy nature. Resale
price maintenance, whether instituted by private agreement or
51. Id. at 32, 1 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,435.
52. Id. at 31-32, $$ 14-15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,435.
53. Id. at 32, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,435.
54. Id. at 10-11, 1 12-13 (submission of Advocate General Darmon).
55. See, e.g., Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, 1904-06,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8435, at 7866-67; Consten and Grundig v. Commission,
Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 342-43, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8046, at 7652.
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by law, is usually justified by considerations of so-called middle
class policy. Such a policy seeks to maintain a sound economic
basis and an adequate geographic spread for the retailing business. Is it really a requirement of Community law to inhibit the
use by Member States of the most effective instruments for
such a policy, especially since the Community itself has no
powers in that domain?
The question is a fair one and deserves a proper answer.
In my view, this is provided by the same Article 5, as interpreted by the Court of Justice. Several times in recent years
the Court has relied on Article 5 in order to define a reciprocal
duty of assistance and cooperation of the Institutions and the
Member States alike in the search for and application of solutions for specific Community problems not otherwise regu56
lated.
In the instance that occupies us here, the conflict with Article 3(f) resides in a lasting and total or quasi-total interdiction of intrabrand price competition. Given the particular nature of such a conflict, the reciprocal duty to cooperate obviously points toward the definition of such parameters of
intrabrand price competition as would permit the co-existence
of national middle class policies and the system of undistorted
competition of Article 3(f). To that effect it would suffice to
render resale price maintenance more flexible by defining a
price bracket rather than a single price level. The width of the
bracket should reflect not only objective differences in retailing
costs, but also the social cost of over-concentration on the distribution level. Member States that for societal reasons wish to
maintain a balanced distribution network are entitled to do so,
but not at the cost of wholly paralyzing the system of undistorted competition of Article 3(f). Basically, this requires only
a modest adjustment in the way the retained power in question
is exercised.
This fact demonstrates how justified it is to rely on Article
3(f) in conjunction with Article 5 in these matters. In the final
result, proper application of Community law as defined by the
Court would give substance to the obligation contained in Ar56. The latest example may be seen in Commission v. Belgium, Case 52/84,
1986 E.C.R. -, -,
16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,297, at 16,852 ("Article 5
...imposes a duty of genuine cooperation on the Member States").
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ticle 6 of the Treaty to coordinate economic policies of which
middle class policy is only a sectoral application. A Community that in the Single Act has solemnly reaffirmed the obligation to create a single market, and even set the date of December 31, 1992, for its achievement, should seize the opportunities offered by the Court in its Leclerc judgment with an open
mind.
V. FREE MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION RULES:
SYMMETRY OR ASYMMETRY?
Judge Pescatore shows the correlation between the Treaty
obligations of Member States and private operators in respect
of both the free movement of goods and of the system of undistorted competition of Article 3(f) in conjunction with Articles 85 and 86.5 ' His contention is that control over the actions of Member States specifically intervening in competition
within the Community's jurisdiction should be strengthened.
He sets this contention in the broader context of the concept
that the rules applicable to undertakings and the rules addressed to Member States are "no more than the specific expression of a general principle.

'5 8

This general principle he

defines as the obligation not to interfere with "the free exchange of goods and services under conditions of fair competition." 5 9

The logic of this position is impeccable. In a single market, competition is not fair when the free exchange of goods is
interfered with. Inversely, when competition is interfered
with, the free exchange of goods is impaired. On the level of
the single market, only a question of perceptibility remains. It
arises when the conceptual interrelationship between the two
instruments of integration is so weak in actual fact that Community concern is not justified.
A different question is whether the mechanics of this relationship justify the application of Article 30 to actions of pri60
vate parties interfering with the free movement of goods.
57. Pescatore, Public and PrivateAspects, supra note 10, at 378-80.
58. Id. at 379.

59. Id.
60. For a more elaborate, cautious reply to this question, see Quinn &
MacGowan, Could Article 30 Impose Obligations on Individuals?, 1987 EUR. L. REV. 163.
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Here, one should distinguish between physical obstacles to
trade created by angry farmers or truck drivers and legal obstacles to trade created by invoking industrial property rights or
national unfair competition laws. The former are in the domain of national police powers and Article 30 would apply to a
systematic refusal to use them. The latter collapse before national courts, which are prevented by Article 30 from treating
the free movement of goods as such as an infringement of
those rights or as unfair competition. Beyond these two instances, private operators have no means of effectively obstructing intra-Community trade except by way of agreement,
concerted practice, or abuse. There is, of course, the phenomenon of private appeals to consumer nationalism and related
attitudes. Rather than swing the heavy gun of Article 30
around, confidence in the market mechanism should be relied
upon to deal with actions of that kind. If that is so, then from
the perspective of the free movement of goods, symmetry and
coherence exist already between the obligations of Member
States and those of private operators.
There remains the case for symmetry in the other direction, that is, the control of the exercise by Member States of
certain retained powers in the light of the system of undistorted competition. In my view, the problem is not the principle of such control, but its delimitation, the definition of its
scope. Only national measures specifically directed at the system of undistorted competition should be apprehended by this
control. When does a national measure belong to that category? When a Member State either intervenes in the circle of
participants in the competitive process by excluding some of
them or deprives participants of significant influence over the
central parameters of their effective competition, that is to say
over prices or quantities. A telling example of such measures
is precisely the institution by law of retail price maintenance.
Large groups of operators are deprived of the instrument of
price competition and thus excluded from the system that
forms a fundamental objective of the Treaty. The context of
the Leclerc judgment indicates that it is this phenomenon that
the Court must have had in mind for the test that it formulated
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in interrogative form.6 '
On this particular point Judge Pescatore welcomes the
judgment. He is disappointed, however, that the Court did not
draw the full consequences of this approach.62 He regrets that
the Court did not declare the incompatibility of regulations of
the type in force in France and instead played the ball back to
the political institutions of the Community.
For my part, I share the Court's prudence, as anticipated
by Advocate General Darmon. 63 As a legal norm, Article 5 of
the Treaty assures the coherence and integrity of the Community's legal order, its immunity against being evaded, undermined, or overtaken, and its seamlessness. By the very nature
of a norm of this kind, its application raises delicate issues, particularly when linked to the fundamental objective of undistorted competition. Such issues preferably should be solved
through the process of reciprocal cooperation and assistance
that Article 5 also implies. Judicial restraint commands that
that process should be given its chance first. True, the Leclerc
judgment proceeds on a narrower base for its restraint, namely
the absence of administrative practice in respect of retail price
maintenance for books. In the context of the case this was sufficient, but in other configurations the broader basis here developed may be more adequate.
Mr. Marenco puts the case for asymmetry. Within their
jurisdiction, and as long as they do not rely on agreements between firms, Member States must be free to intervene in the
workings of the competitive system if they are to be able to
have national policies at all, as the Treaty allows them.64 The
idea contained in the Leclerc judgment that Community law
puts restraints on this freedom other than the ones resulting
from the free movement of goods is anathema to him. 65 He
similarly disagrees with Judge Pescatore's demonstration of
the fundamental symmetry Of objectives underlying the Treaty
61. See Leclerc, 1985 E.C.R. at 32, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at
15,435.
62. Pescatore, Public and PrivateAspects, supra note 10, at 411-12; see also Kuyper,
supra note 9, at 806-08.
19 (submission of Advocate General
63. See Leclerc, 1985 E.C.R. at 15-16,
Darmon).
64. Marenco, supra note 10, at 428, 433-34.
65. Id. at 439-40.
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in this respect and the consequences thereof for the exercise of
retained powers. Mr. Marenco sees great dangers in this trend.
Member States will be deprived overnight of important regulatory powers and the Community would take a step away from
the decentralized approach towards more centralism.6 6 American case law about the state action defense to antitrust actions
is recommended as an example for a Community that is even
more diverse than the United States.6 7
The trouble with these fears is that they are based on a
literal reading 68 of the Court's question, in paragraph 15 of the
Leclerc judgment, whether restrictive agreements are made superfluous by state action, without paying attention either to the
context of the case and the way in which it was argued, or to
the broader case law on fundamental rules or objectives generally and on Article 3(f) in particular. This is to be regretted
and flaws his case. It may well be that a particular judgment is
not a pinnacle of clarity and consistency. Nevertheless, commentators do well to see whether a reasonable interpretation is
possible rather than to draw ad absurdum consequences and
never look up again from there.
I submit that a reasonable interpretation is possible. All
the Leclerc judgment does is confirm that Member States may
neither interfere unilaterally in the Commission's prerogatives
under Article 85(3) nor distort unilaterally the central parameters of the competitive system envisaged by the Treaty. This is
far removed from a dramatic confrontation between laissezfaire and government intervention.
It is not only Mr. Marenco's point of departure that is
wrong. Most of his supporting arguments are equally unconvincing. For instance he reads far too much in Article 37 and
Article 90 of the Treaty. These provisions concern state enterprises of various kinds and assimilated enterprises, and Article
90 in particular provides that all Treaty rules apply, unless the
66. Id. at 429, 442-43.
67. Id. at 436-37.
68. Id. at 439. Mr. Marenco's insistence on a literal reading of point 15 is all the
more surprising as he qualifies a literal reading of Dansk Supermarked v. Imerco,
Case 55/80, 1981 E.C.R. 181, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8729, as insufficient.
Marenco, supra note 10, at 426. The Court itself discards literal interpretation if it
leads to absurd results. See, e.g., Fellinger v. Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Case 67/79,
1980 E.C.R. 535, 549-51.
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very function of an undertaking would become impossible.
The rules in question have been included in the Treaty in order to make sure that Member States do not use their public
sector as a means of evading Treaty obligations. Thus understood, these articles are rather in support of the Court's position that retained regulatory powers equally should not enter
into conflict with fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The
idea that because Member States by virtue of Article 222 are
free to extend their public sectors,6 9 their regulatory powers
should also know of no other limits than the requirements of
free movement of goods is a non-sequitur of the first magnitude.
It is true that the Treaty remains wisely neutral in the
political debate on the respective merits of private and public
ownership. The question of Treaty limits on the exercise of
retained powers is a different one, the answer to which must be
found in the letter, spirit, and system of the Treaty as interpreted by the Court. In that approach, the weight of the argument is in favor of the position that State intervention in intrabrand competition between independent private operators
must respect the system of undistorted competition of Article
3(f) and the Commission's jurisdiction in respect thereof.
It is significant in this context that Mr. Marenco remains
silent about the Court's methods of interpretation. As is well
known, the Court relies frequently on the useful effect of
Treaty provisions. Many provisions of the Treaty, and especially those implementing the fundamental objectives of free
movement of goods and of undistorted competition, are emphatically comprehensive in their formulation and are interpreted by the Court in a manner that gives the maximum of
substance to their all-embracing character.7 0 When, as in the
present instance, the precise scope of a ruling of the Court is in
doubt, a reference to this characteristic of the Court's case law
is indispensable and silence on the point leads to bad results.
This shortcoming of Mr. Marenco's approach is particularly visible in his rendering of both Article 3(f) and Article
69. "This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing
the system of property ownership." EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 222, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 1, at 70, 298 U.N.T.S. at 88.
70. See, e.g., Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R.
215, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171.
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5(2) of the Treaty. As to Article 3(f), it is wrong to limit its
scope to the competition articles of the Treaty as the only indication of what the authors of the Treaty had in mind. 7 It is
equally wrong to state that Article 5 "does not inject any new
substance into the obligations of the Member States." 7 2 In a
considerable number of cases the Court relied on Article 5 as a
source of additional obligations of Member States and not just
as a principle of interpretation of pre-existing specific duties.7 3
Another weakness of Mr. Marenco's reasoning is the
premise that the Treaty of Rome only aims at competition between state economies.7 ' The matter of state internal competition between domestic and out-of-state operators alike-so he
argues-is reserved for Member States, provided the rules they
lay down are indistinctly applicable. 7 5 Here his thinking reflects a theory about Article 30 that limits its application to discriminatory treatment of imports. It is well known, however,
that the Court attaches a wider meaning to Article 30 that includes the obligation of Member States to choose such national measures as hinder imports least. 76 The test is not only
equal treatment of imports and domestic supplies, but also
minimum perturbance of the free movement of goods compatible with the national policy aims pursued. With this in mind,
the issue is not whether anticompetitive state regulation is
compatible with the Treaty but whether State intervention in
competition, apart from being non-discriminatory, must respect the same principle of proportionality. Seen in this light
the narrower premise put forward by Mr. Marenco does not
correctly reflect the Court's assessment under Article 30 of the
exercise by Member States of retained powers.
71. Marenco, supra note 10, at 433. For the broader frame of reference that I
think more correct, see supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
72. Marenco, supra note 10, at 434.
73. See supra note 40.

74. Marenco, supra note 10, at 422.
75. See id.

76. Cin~th~que v. Fdration Nationale des Cinemas Frangais ("Video Cassettes"), Joined Cases 60-61/84, 1985 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,220; Judgment of March 12, 1987, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany
(Reinheitsgebot), Case 178/84, 1987 E.C.R. (German standards for manufacture of beer may not operate to preclude imports of beer lawfully manufactured elsewhere); see supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text. For a comment on the
Reinheitsgebot case, see Germany Must Admit Foreign Beers Even Though Not Up to Ger-

man Standard, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

10,866.
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In vain Mr. Marenco attempts to bolster his case by references to United States case law on state action. 77 Some parallelism can indeed be discerned, but that does not make United
States law an example to be followed. Quite apart from the
fact that United States case law on state action does not always
shine with analytical depth or consistency, the United States
legal order does not have the precise equivalent of Article 3(f).
What is more, the societal context of the problem is very different. In the United States the forces of unity largely dominate
the centrifugal tendencies. In the Community the situation is
the reverse. The danger of disintegration is omnipresent.
This alone explains the different attitude of the Court towards
state action that endangers vital parameters of the competitive
system.
In sum, the main legal techniques deployed by Mr.
Marenco in the defense of his views and in the criticisms of
both the Leclerc judgment and Judge Pescatore's article are not
well founded. His is an approach to Community law that neglects the comprehensiveness of the Community legal order
and its defenses against the disintegration that may be caused
by the exercise of retained powers in the absence of adequate
Community control. These defenses are an essential element
of the original intent of the authors of the Treaty and they
should not be weakened by narrow interpretations more appropriate to the application of Justinian's Digest than to the
implementation of the Treaty of Rome. The Court at any rate
has always avoided that error. Both Advocate General
Darmon's submissions and the Leclercjudgment itself are additional proof that these defenses are kept intact. To reason
otherwise is to confuse partial integration with incoherence in
the distribution of powers between Member States and the
Community.
CONCLUSION
Historically, the Community has always struggled with the
interface between integrated and retained powers. The first attempt at a general formula gave birth to Article 67 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty and the balancing
77. Marenco, supra note 10, at 436-37.
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mechanism it contains, always under Community control. 78 Article 101 of the EEC Treaty contains another attempt, but it
has not been very successful either. 79 The Leclerc judgment is
an important judicial step toward a more modern mechanism
for the EEC domain as a whole. The conceptual underpinnings for this development still need refinement. Judge Pescatore has made a significant contribution to that. My own
hope is that the Commission will forget its reluctance to go
forward on this road and activate the instrument that the Court
has given it. When operators complain that they are deprived
of their rights as market citizens in a system of undistorted
competition, the Commission should face the issue and go to
the root of it. 8
This does not apply only to Member States' interventions
in the system of undistorted competition. The Community itself occasionally intervenes in a manner that raises serious
questions. This is demonstrated by two examples. Isoglucose,
a sugar substitute, is prevented from obtaining the market
share that its intrinsic merits would justify.8 ' As a transitional
measure designed to keep the necessary adjustment of sugar
production within the terms of Article 39, this is justified. As a
quasi-permanent sharing of the market by Community legislation, it is in my view a violation of Article 3(f). A second example is resale price maintenance for tobacco products.8 2 This
particular measure is closely intertwined with the way in which
indirect taxation on tobacco products is organized with Community blessing. In other words, the Community has provided
78. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
art. 67, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd. 5189), 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1951).
79. See Vaughan, Competition, supra note 20, 19.29, at 876-77, 19.101, at 921.
80. A new opportunity is provided by a request for a preliminary ruling by the
Tribunal de Grande Instance of Alen~on, Syndicat des Libraires de Normandie v.
L'Aigle Distribution-Centre Leclerc, Case 254/87, O.J. C 236/2 (1987). The questions raised are closer than ever to the real issues and could be focused on them with
little rephrasing.
81. See Maizena v. Council, Case 139/79, 1980 E.C.R. 3393, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8704; Royal Scholten-Honig v. Intervention Bd. for Agricultural Produce,
Joined Cases 103 and 145/77, 1978 E.C.R. 2037, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8646;
Koninklijke Scholten-Honig v. Council and Commission, Case 143/77, 1979 E.C.R.
3583, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8641; Amylum v. Council and Commission,
Joined Cases 116 and 124/77, 1979 E.C.R. 3497, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8640.
82. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text; see also Marenco, Note, 1984
REV. TRIMESTRIELLE DU DROIT EUR.
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the legal basis for a system that technically makes free movement of goods practically impossible and that favors national
interdictions of intrabrand price competition. The compatibility of such a measure with the fundamental objectives of the
Treaty is highly questionable. The Leclerc judgment of the
Court should encourage the Commission not only to grasp the
nettle of the few national measures that suppress central parameters of competition, but also to reconsider some of the
Community's own interventions in the market.

